Growing Pains: An Employment Compliance Primer for Small Employers by Robinson, Robert K. et al.
Sik4rXVF
BEST APPLIED PAPER AWARD RECIPIENT
2003 Small Business Institute Conference
GROWING PAINS: AN EMPLOYMENT COMPLIANCE PRIMER
FOR SMALL EMPLOYERS
Robert K. Robinson
The University of Mississippi
brobinson~bus.olemtss edit
Geralyn McClure Franklin
The Umversity of Texas of the Permian Basin
frankti n~@utpb. edu
A. M. Nunley III
The University of Texas of the Permian Basin
nunley a@utpb.edu
ABSTRACT
Stnatl employers often have an advantage over their larger counterparts in that they are not
subject to certain regulatory compliance requirements. However, as small
employers'vorkforces
expand, the organizations become subj ect to various federal employment statutes.
This paper reviews tlie primary federal employment laws that are likely to impact small firms
as tliey grow. lt also provides suggestions for dealing with these mandates.
I
INTRODUCTION
There is a distinct advantage to being a small organization, especially in the realm of
regulatory compliance. Most federal employment statutes apply only when an employer's
workforce reaches a minimum threshold. Those who operate below that threshold are not
under the lurisdiction of the statutes and, therefore, are not legally obligated to comply with.
their provisions. Most small businesses begin below this threshold (and as will be seen, this
threshold does vary from law to law). However, as many small businesses prosper and grow,
expanding workforces (sometimes as few as four employees) often cross the invisible line into
regulatory compliance obligations. Figure I provides a list of the major federal employment
laws and the minimum number of employees that identifies employers who are covered under
them.
The purpose of this paper is to address the range of employment laws that are likely to affect
successful small businesses as they grow In doing so, the employer size requirements that
impose compliance obligations under each specific act and the act's major provisions are
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outlined. Additionally, the penalties for noncompliance authorized under each statute are
discussed. Although our review of these laws is extensive, it is only cursory.
Figure I - Major Conipliance Laws Affecting Small Employers
Age Discrimination in & 20 employees for each working day in each of 20 or
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1976 more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
(as aniended) calendar year
Americans with Disabilities Act & 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or
(ADA) of 1990 more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title Vll & 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or
(as amended) more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year
Civil Rights Act of 1991 & 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Employers who engage in interstate commerce,
of 193$ (as amended) produce goods for interstate commerce, or handle, sell
or work on goods or materials that have been moved in
or produced for interstate commerce. For most firms, a
test of not less than $500,000 in annual dollar volume
of business applies
Family and Medical Leave Act & 50 full'-time employees within 75 miles of facility
(FMLA) of 1993
Immigration Reform and Control All employers regardless of size
Act (IRCA) of 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Employers & 4 employees
Act (IRCA) of 1986
Nondiscrimination Provision
Worker Adjustment and & 100 full-time employees who have worked at least 6
Retraining Notification Act months in the previous 12 months
(WARN) of 198$
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The lirst body of employment law of importance to small employers is the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Enacted in 1938, the FLSA governs three aspects of employer-
employee relations: (1) the federal minimum wage, (2) overtime, and (3) child labor.
Minimum Wage
The FLSA requires all covered employers (includes most employers) to pay nonexempt
employees at least $5.15 per hour. Nonexempt employees are those employees who are
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covered by the FLSA's minimum wage and/or overtime provisions. Failure to provide
minimum wages and overtime payments to nonexempt employees will result in a FLSA
violation Shortly, erempt employees, those for whom minimum wage and overtime do not
apply, will be discussed. First, however, two variants of minimum wage for nonexempt
employees are addressed: (1) tipped employees and (2) compensatory time..
Tipped Employees
Since many small employers are in the hospitality industry and employ tipped employ'ees (like
wait staff), it is important to understand the employer responsibilities under the FLSA for such
employees. Under the FLSA, tipped employees are entitled to the federal minimum wage.
Though employers may credit a certain amount of the tips received by employees against the
minimum ivage'bligation, an employer's obligated to pay tipped employees not less than
$2.13 per hour in wages (U.S: Employment Standards Administration, Fact Sheet No. J5,
'002).Provided that the $2.13 per hour wage plus tips equals or exceeds the federal
minnnum wage, the employer is not required to provide any additio'nal wkge to tipped
employees. In the'event that an employee's cash wage combinett with tips 'does not equal the
minimum'ourly wage, the employer must make up the difference (U.S. Employment
'tandardkAdmmistration, Fact Sheet No: 002, 2001).
Compensatory Time
Compeiisatory'titne is time off in lieu of overtime comp'ensation. If an employer offers
'orn'pensatorytime to einployees, there are two issues of concern. First, any compensatory
time off must be calculated at a'ate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of
employment for which overtime compensation would have been paid (fair labor standard Act,
29 V.S.C. IJ 201 et seq.(2001). For example, if an employee worked 46 hours in a'168
consecutive hour work week, that employee would be entitled to 9 hours compensatory time
(46 hours — 40 hours of standard work week = 6 hours overtime; 6 hours * I'/~ = 9 hours
compensatory time).
Th'e second conceni'relates to the limits'tion currently pla'ced on private sector employers that
'he
compensatory time must be used within the pay period it was accrued. For example,
assume that an employee is paid twice monthly (the first and fifteenth of each month). During
the week of June 1-7, the employee worked 50 hours. The employee would be entitled to
15'ours
compensatory time (50 hours - 40 hours of standard work week = 10 hours overtime 10
hours * I '/. = 15 hours compensatory time) but would have to use the compensatory time the
following week because the pay period expires on June 15. The compensatory time cannot be
accrued (like it is in the public sector) and used at a 'time that is convenient for either the
employer or employee. This also means that compensatory time is not a viable option for
employees who are private sector employees and paid on a weekly basis. Interestingly, there
is currently a bill in Congress to remedy this situation, but it has yet to be enacted.
Overtime
The FLSA establishes the standard employee's workweek at a fixed period of 168 corisecutive
hours, or 7 consecutive 24-ho'ur periods. Note that in the health care industry for certain health
care professions this has been extended to a fixed period of 336 consecutive hours, 'or 14
consecutive 24-hour periods. In most instances, any overtime pay accrued in a particular
workweek must be paid on the regular payday for the pay period in which the wages were
earned. Whatever the employee's regular rate of pay is, it cannot be less than the minimum
wage. The regular rate (straight-time rate) does not include reimbursement for expenses
incurred on the employer's behalf, premium payments for overtime work, special premiums
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paid for work on weekends and holidays, discretionary bonuses, gifts and payments in the
nature of gifts on special occasions, and payments for occasional periods when no work is
performed due to vacation, holidays, or illness (U.S. Department of Labor, Fact Slicer iuo. 23,
2002).
Once the employee's regular rate or straight-time rate has been determined, nonexempt
employees are entitled to one and one-half times that rate for each hour worked in excess of
40 (80 in healthcare professions) during the 168 consecutive hour (336 in healthcare) work
week. However, no overtime is required for exempt employees.
Exempt Employees
Erempr empkryees are those employees who are specifically excluded from the FLSA's
protection for minimum wage and overtime. The fact of the matter is that so many classes of
employees are covered by the FLSA (nonexempt employees), that it was easier for Congress
to identify those who were not protected under it (exempt employees). The FLSA provides
exemptions from minimum wage and overtime payments as well as some partial exemptions
from overtime only. The most common exemptions are as follows: (I) Commissioned sales
employees of retail or service establishments are exempt from overtime provided that more
than half of their earnings come from commissions and these earnings average at least one-
half times the minimum wage for each hour worked; (2) Computer professionals who are paid
at least $27.63 per hour are exempt; (3) Salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics employed by
automobile dealerships are exempt; (4) Seasonal and recreational establishnients are exempt
from both the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the FLSA; and (5) White collar
employees employed in executive, administrative, professional, or outside sales positions (as
defined by the Department of Labor (DOL)) who are paid on a salary basis are exempt from
both the minimum wage and overtime.
Note that, particularly regarding white-collar employees, it is not what the employer calls an
employee that counts. Calling an employee an "executive" does not make that employee a
bona fide executive. The only operative definition is the DOL's definition. For example, a
bona fide executive is one who spends no more than 20 percent of his or her time in
nonmanagerial activities (no more than 40 percent of his or her time in the retail and service
industries), supervises at least two employees, and receives a salary of not less than $345 per
week (fair labor standard Act 29 C.F.R. Ij 541.1). If these three conditions cannot be met, the
DOL will not consider the employee in question to be a nonexempt employee, and that
individual will be entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA.
Child Labor Limitations
Employers may assign employees who are 18 years or older to any position in the workplace,
to work at any time, and to work in virtually any context (provided that the working
conditions are in compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act). But, applicants
or employees under age 18 are restricted in some or all of these categories. Workers 16 and
17 years old may work for unlimited hours, but only in nonhazardous jobs. Hazardous jobs
are enumerated by the Secretary of Labor and are off limits to all workers younger than 18
years of age (fair labor standard Act, 29 U.S.C. tj 212). Among the jobs identified as
hazardous are: manufacturing or storing explosives, driving a motor vehicle, operating
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power-driven wood-workmg machines, meat packing or processing, wrecking, demolition, nd
ship-breakmg operations, and roofing operations (fair labor standard Act 29 C.F.R 6
570.33).'or
workers between 14 and 15 years, there are also limitations on both the hours that can be
worked and the time of day that the work may occur. During periods when school is in
session, these workers are permitted to work outside school in nonmanufacturing, nonmining,
and nonhazardous Jobs within specific hourly and time limits. For example, on school days,
14 and 15 year-olds are restricted to working no more than 3 hours per day and may only
work within a time frame between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. Furthermore, the total number of hours
that can be worked m a school week is capped at 15 (fair labor standard Act,29'U.S.C. 6
212.).
During nonschool days, the 14 or 15 year-old employee may work up to 8 hours, and during
the nonschool week, he or she may accrue up to 40 total hours (fair labor standard Act,29
U.S.C. Ij 212). Dunng the period June 1 to Labor Day, the time frame during which 14 and
15 year-olds may work is expanded from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. Again, 14 and 15 year-olds are
excluded from hazardous jobs even during the summer months.
There is encouragement for small employers trying to give their own children an early start in
the family business. Individuals who work for their parents or spouses are exempt under the
FLSA.
Commonly Held Myths About The FLSA
There are many misconceptions, especially among employees, about pay and benefits
mandated by the FLSA. Beyond the previously discussed minimum wage, overtime, and
child labor restnctions, the FLSA imposes no other requirements on covered employers.
Since there are so many misconceptions arising from the FLSA's requirements, here are just a
few examples of compensation requirements that the Act does not really mandate. Nothing in
the FLSA imposes any obligation on employers to provide employees with vacation, holiday,
severance, or sick pay. The FLSA does not require an employer to furnish employees with
meal or rest periods, holidays off, or vacations, paid or not. These are strictly at the option bf
the employer, unless otherwise required under state law. Neither does the Act obligate
employers to provide premium pay for working on weekends, at night, or on holidays.
Employers are not required to offer pay raises or fringe benefits. Finally, the FLSA does not
impose any obligation to provide terminated employees with a discharge notice, reason for
discharge, or immediate payment of final wages. Many employees believe that they must be
paid in full all accrued wages immediately upon discharge. In most instances, final payment
can be made at the next normally scheduled pay period, unless required under state law or
local ordinance.
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT
Because it applies to all employers, even small employers should have knowledge of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. IRCA was enacted for the expressed
purpose of curbing illegal immigration into the United States. The rationale behind its
enactment was simple —remove the incentive for illegal immigrants to come to the United
States by making it illegal to hire them. Prior to 1986, it had been illegal for undocumented
aliens to be in the United States, but it was not against the law to hire them, Now, this has
'For a complete list of hazardous occupations, consult The Department of Labor Regulations,
Occupations particularly Hazardous for the Employment ofMinors Between /6 and I8 Years
ofAge or Detritnental to Their Health or Well-Being, 29 C.F.R. ()tj 570.50-570.68.
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been corrected. Any employer who knowingly hires an illegal immigrant may be subject to a
schedule of fines rangmg from $275 to $ 10,000for each ttnatttttorized alien depending on the
severity of the offense and number of previous offenses (8 C.F.R. tj 274a.10(b)(1)). There are
even criminal penalties authonzed under IRCA that carry imprisonment for up to 6 months for
any person who engages in a pattern or practice of violations (8 C.F.R. tj 274a.10(a)). Figure
2 details the penalties for noncompliance under IRCA.
Figure 2 - Penalties for Noncompliance Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
Knowingly Recruiting and Hiring an Failure to Comply with Documentation/
Undocumented Workers Verification Requirements
I Offense $ 275 — $2,200 $ 110 - $ 1,100
2" Offense $2,200- $3,300
3 Of'fense $3,300 - $ 11,000
Pattern of Offenses $3,000 and 6 Mo.
Imprisonment
Sotrrce tt C.FR. I 274a.to
Interestingly, most violations connected with IRCA do not arise from hiring undocumented
workers. Most violations arise from failing to comply with the Act's employment verification
procedures. Fines for failure to prove that an employee's employment status was done in
accordance with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations may range
from $ 110 to $ 1,100 for each employee for whom verification was not performed (8 C.F.R. I)
274a.10(b)(2)) (see Figure 2).
Since 1986, all employers, regardless of size, are required to verify the employment eligibility
of all applicants by requiring the applicant to complete the Form 1-9, "Employee Information
and Verification" (8 C.F.R. t3 274a.2(b)). In addition to having the applicant complete the 1-9,
the employer is required to request documentation from the applicant to establish his or her
identity and employment eligibility, This verification must be accomplished within three days
of the hire. Employers are encouraged to keep on file photostatic copies of the employee's
Form 1-9 in order to prove that the documents were physically examined. The documents that
the INS accepts for verification purposes are listed in Figure 3.
In addition to prohibiting the hiring of illegal aliens, IRCA also prohibits discrimination in
hiring and discharge based on national origin (as does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (addressed in the next section of this paper)) and on citizenship status. These
antidiscrimination provisions are intended to prevent employers from attempting to comply
with the Act's work authorization requirements by discriminating against foreign-looking or
foreign-sounding job applicants. Of particular concern for smaller organizations is that
IRCA's antidiscrimination provisions apply to even smaller employers than those covered by
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-enforced laws (discussed later in this paper).
IRCA's national origin discrimination provisions apply to employers with between 4 and 14
employees (those employers who would not be covered by Title VII) (8 U.S.C.
1324b(a)(2)(B)). IRCA's citizenship discrimination provisions effectively extend protection
against discrimination based on national origin to all workplaces with at least 4 employees.
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Figure 3 - Verillcation Requirements Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
Documents Establishing
Documents Establishing Only Documents EstablishingBoth Employment
Employment Authorization only IdentityAuthorization and Identity
U.S. Passport Social Security Card State Driver's License
Certificate of U.S. Citizenship U.S. Birth Certificate State Identification for
those under Age 16
Certificate of Naturalization Other Documentation
Authorizing Employment in the
Resident Alien Card (if card U.S. Approved by the Attorney
contains photo of individual) General
Foreign Passport with the
authonzation of the Attorney
General to work in the U.S.
Source 8 U.S.C. g 1324a(b)(l)((3).
Because lawmakers were concerned that the verification process and penalties for hiring
undocumented workers might cause employers to be reluctant to hire applicants of Hispanic
origin, IRCA contains provisions making an unfair immigration-related employment practice
for:
...a person or other entity to discriminate against any individual (other
than an unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or
referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the
individual from employment —"(a) because of such individual's national
origin, or (b) in the case of a citizen or intending citizen (as defined in
paragraph (3)) because of such individual's citizenship status (g U.S.C. (l
1324b(a)).
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964's Title VII is the foundation of most of the laws and regulations
that affect equal employment opportunity (EEO) in the workplace. It applies to a small
business once that business employs 15 or more employees during any 20 weeks during the
preceding year. Title Vll is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Specifically in Section 703 of the Act:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - '(I) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin (42 U.S.C. () 2000e-2(a)).
This section forbids a covered employer from taking into consideration any applicant's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin when making any employment-related decision. For
example, if an employer considered an applicant's ethnicity in making a decision, then Title
Vll is violated. If the fact that an applicant is a female affects a promotion decision, Title VII
7
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is violated. Title Vll's purpose is to get employers to make employment decisions based only
on an individual's qualifications. Figure 4 provides a hst of typical employment decisions
that may result in Title VII violations. In short, different treatment of anyone in the workplace
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is an unlawful activity.
Figure 4 - Employment Practices that May Result in Vnlawful Discrimination
~ Recruiting ~ Training ~ Working Conditions
~ Selection ~ Wages ~ Apprenticeships
~ Promotion ~ Benefits ~ Performance
~ Transfers ~ Terminations Appraisal
~ Layoffs ~ Work Assignments
There are two basic theones of unlawful discrimination under Title Vll: (I) disparate
treatment and (2) disparate impact. Disparate treattnent results from treating individuals in
the workplace differently because of their membership in a protected class. It is intentional
and is characterized by imposing different standards on different people. The other theory,
titsparnte impact, focuses the small employer's concerns to statistical imbalances in the
workforce. Quite often it is unintentional and is characterized by imposing the same standards
on all people with different outcomes for different groups. Although a discussion of the legal
proofs for each of these theories is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important for small
employers to understand that there are differences. If charges of unlawful discrimination
arise, small employers should consult appropriate legal counsel.
National Origin as a Protected Class
Much has been written about race, color, religion, and sex as protected classes. However, as a
result of the events of September 11, 2001, significant attention has been focused on national
origin as a protected class. It is for this reason that we are devoting specific attention to this
issue.
Though Title VII prohibits employers from considering a candidate's national origin when
making any employment decision, there are some employment discnmination issues that are
unique to national origin that must now be addressed. Because members of some ethnic
groups often display nationality-specific characteristics (religious affiliation, speech patterns,
languages, surnames, e.g.), Title VII can be violated when a connection can be made between
those characteristics and unfavorable treatment in the workplace. Three specific areas related
to n'ational origin discrimination are: (I) IRCA-related issues, (2) language, and (3) English-
only work rules.
IRCA-Related Issues
Title VII may be violated during the IRCA verification process (discussed in the previous
section of this paper) if individuals of one national origin group (like Hispanics) are subjected
to greater scrutiny than individuals from other groups. For example, an applicant with a
Hispanic surname is given a thorough background investigation while a candidate with a
Western European surname only has her driver's license and social security card photocopied.
This would be a Title VII violation because the individual with the Hispanic surname was
subjected to different treatment (a more rigorous application process) because of his national
origin.
In complying with IRCA's verification requirements, it is important to treat all employees the
same. If thorough background checks are initiated, they must be initiated on all applicants,
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not just those of one particular national origin. It should be noted that IRCA does permit
employers to gwe preference in hiung and recruiting of American citizens over foreign
nationalsif tlie»vo intl»itlnnls nre equally qualified (8 U.S.C. tj 1324b(a)(4)).
Interestmgly, national ongin discrimination is not merely limited to members of the ethntc
group against whom discrimination is directed. If an employer punishes nonethnic employees
for associating or fraternizing with members of an ethnic group whom the employer finds
distasteful, Title VII has been violated. If an employee is subjected to adverse employment
outcomes because he or she is married to a member of an ethnic group the employer finds
offensive, Title VII is again violated on the basis of national origin. To illustrate, assume that
a white nonkhspanic male employee has a wife who is of Cuban ancestry. Also assume that
his employer disapproves of mixed marriages between "Anglos" and Hispanics. As a result of
this attitude, the employee is continually passed over for promotion and receives no merit pay
raises. The white male employee is being discriminated against on the basis of the nationahty
of his wife. This is unlawful discrimination under Title VII.
Language
A potential problem related to ethnicity is language proficiency. A substantial proportion of
the workforce's projected growth is from immigration (Bowman, 1997). Many newly-
arrived legal immigrants to the United States have limited language proficiency. In some
parts of the nation, languages other than English are spoken. The language of preference for
the local population may be Spanish, Russian, Vietnamese, or a combination thereof. As the
United States is becoming increasingly diverse, it is also becoming increasingly multilingual.
Employers who base employment decisions on language proficiency (whether it is English,
Spanish, Russian, Mandarin, etc.) must be able to justify such preferences as being related to
job performance. This language requirement also encompasses accents. To illustrate this
point, assume that an apphcant is applying for a position as a driver for a small parcel delivery
service. The female applicant speaks conversational English but with a thick French accent.
Can she be denied the job based upon her accent? What information would you have to
possess to make that call? How critical is speaking English without an accent to the
performance of the essential job functions of a parcel delivery person? If your job
analysis'hows
that it has little, if any, impact on job performance, then rejecting the applicant based
on her accent could be unlawful discrimination based on national origin.
Now assume that the position for which the heavily accented job candidate has applied is that
of a dispatcher for a small ambulance service. Based upon job analysis that may indicate that
clearly enunciated communications between the dispatcher and ambulance personnel is an
essential component of the job, can the employer now disqualify the applicant because of her
accent? If the employer can demonstrate that her accent is so heavy it affects comprehension
then she is being denied employment based on a job-related reason rather than her nationality.
English-Only Work Rules
English-only work rules require employees to speak English during work hours as a condition
of employment. This creates a problem for employers as the EEOC's Guidelines'n.
Discrimination Because of National Origin (2000) currently declare that employer policies
prohibiting employees from speaking their primary language at all times may create an
"atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation which could result in a discHminatory
For a thorough discussion ofIob analysis, see Gatewood, R. D. and Feild, H. S. (2001),
Human Resource Selection (5 ed.), Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers.
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ivorkmg environment". Consequently, any language policy that creates a complete bar to
speaking languages other than English is likely to be interpreted by the EEOC as a potential
Title VII violation and, therefore, is subject to very strict scrutiny.
While the EEOC has created disincentives to drive employers away from English-only
policies, except where business necessity can be demonstrated, the EEOC also requires
employers to maintam a workmg environment free from harassment on the basis of race (U.S.
EEOC, 2000, tj 1603), sex (U.S. EEOC, 2000, tj 1604.11),and national origin (U.S. EEOC,
2000, t) 1606.8(a)). Here arises the dilemma for the small employer. What happens when an
employer implements an English-only rule in response to a racial or sexual harassment
complaint? Will the federal government conclude that the employer is merely meeting its
obligation to maintain a harassment-free workplace, or will it conclude that the employer is
discriminating against nonEnghsh speakers on the basis of nationahty?
The apparent solution to this dilemma was offered in the Ninth Circuit case, Garcia v. Spun
Steak Company (1993). Spun Steak Company, a California poultry and meat processor,
implemented an English-only rule for the expressed purpose of promoting racial harmony in
the workplace. The company's policy had been initiated in response to complaints that some
Hispanic workers were using their bilingual capabilities to make "derogatory, racist"
comments about an African American coworker in Spanish. As a repercussion of perceived
racial harassment, the employer imposed a new policy that only English would be spoken in
the company dunng work penods. It is important to note that this policy was not an all
inclusive prohibition; Spanish could still be spoken during lunch breaks and on the
employees'wn
time. However, no language but English could be spoken in work areas during work
times.
The Spanish-speaking employees then argued that the language policy was discriminatory on
two points: (I) it denied them a privilege enjoyed by English-only speakers: the ability to talk
in the language with which they felt most comfortable and (2) it created an atmosphere of
inferiority and intimidation (Garcia v. Spun Steak Company, 1993). The Ninth Circuit
observed that Title VII is not intended to protect employees from policies that "merely
inconvenience" them, rather it exists to protect them only against practices that have a
significant impact. Because the employees in this case were bilingual, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the English-only rule did not preclude conversation on the job, merely Spanish
conversation while engaged in normal work activities. Bilingual employees could still
converse in English.
Because there was substantial evidence that the policy was a business necessity, it was
justified in order to prevent certain employees from using their fluency in a language other
than English to intimidate monolingual coworkers who were members of other ethnic groups.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the policy did not violate Title VII.
When language restrictions are necessitated in the workplace, it becomes incumbent upon the
employer to ensure that the following general guidelines are observed. First, and foremost, is
there any alternative to resolving the problem without resorting to limiting use of a given
language (Piatt, 1993)? If not, then the employer must ensure that the English-only policy is
justified by "business necessity" (U.S. EEOC, 2000, t) 1606.7(b)). This means ensuring that
this rationale is documented and that the policy is implemented with the expectation that the
offended employees will challenge it. If it cannot be readily and reasonably justified, you
should not have an English-only policy.
In addition, care must be taken to ensure that the policy does not create a universal prohibition
throughout the place of employment. Rather, the English-only provisions should be limited to
10
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those activities and during those times that are mandated by the previously established
business necessity (U.S. EEOC, 2000, ss 1606.7(b)) Invariably, this means limiting the
language restrictions to work-related communications and work settings. Requiring
employees to speak English only in conversations in nonwork areas during nonwork times
should be avoided. Finally, before any Enghsh-only policy is enforced, it is
absolutely'mperative
that the employer first makes the affected employees aware of the policy and the
consequences for not obeying it. In its Guirlelhres on Diseraniiiaiion Because of National
Origni (2000), the EEOC asserts that any employer's failure to notify its employees of the
consequences of violating the English-only requirement would result in the Commission
concluding "the employer's application of the [Enghsh-only] rule as evidence of
discrimination" if it then took disciplinary action. As always, documentation of both the
busmess justification for the policy and the specific notification process are highly
recommended.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed into law on November 17, 1991.This Act not only
provided for punitive and compensatory damages in specific cases of intentional employment
discrimination (42 U.S.C. lS 1981(a)), it also permitted employment discrimination cases to be
heard by a jury. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, victuns of intentional digcrimination
were not entitled to punitive and compensatory damages, and all Title VII suits were heard
before a federal judge only.
Interestingly, whenever punitive and compensatory damages are imposed, they are limited by
ceilings (maximum amounts that can be imposed). The ceilings are based on the number of
workers an employer employs and arc provided in Figure 5. These cedings are the maximum
monetary awards that federal judges may impose for punitive and compensatory damages for
each victim of discrimination.
Figure 5- Maximum Awards for Punitive and Compensatory Damages
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Maximum Combined Punitive andSize of Employer's Compensatory Damages perWork Force
Complaining Party
15-200 $50,000
201-300 $ 100,000
301-500 $200,000
&500 $300,000
Source: 29 U.S C. 8'98la.
To demonstrate how this works, assume that a company which employs 43 workers has been
found to have intentionally violated Title VII by terminating two employees because of their,
national origin. Based on the evidence, the judge has decided that the employer's actions
violated Title VII and were callous enough to justify punitive and compensatory damages.
The judge may award any amount up to $50,000 in damages to each of the two employees.
The judge also has the discretion to award different amounts to each party (i.e., $50,000 to
one worker and $25,000 to the other). The maximum penalty that the employer could face is
$ 100,000 if the judge determined that both employees could be entitled individually to the
maximum penalty. If the employer had 213 employees, then the highest potential penalty
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would be $200,000 because each aggrieved employee could be awarded individually the
$ 100,000 maximum by the court.
Newspaper stories sometimes report multimillion-dollar punitive and/or compensatory
damages awarded by juries. Such awards are often misleading if the charge, as it was in this
case, was exclusively a Title Vll violation. The maximum amount that can be awarded by a
court for such a violation is $300,000 (42 U.S.C. I) 1981(b)(3)(D)). It is a pecuhanty of the
system that when a jury is requested to hear a Title Vll case, the court is required not to
inform the jury of the limitations of the compensatory and punitive damages (42 U.S.C. tj
1981(c)(2)). Because of this oddity, juries may award substantial damage awards that the
judges must then reduce to the maximum limits shown in Figure 5.
This Civil Rights Act of 1991 also expanded the jurisdiction of Title VII to the overseas
plants, offices, and facilities of American-owned companies. Previously, Title VII only had
the force of law within the United States and its territories.
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
An employer is required to conform to the provisions of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) once the workforce reaches 20 or more employees for at least 20
weeks during the previous year. Under the ADEA, an employer cannot discriminate against
any employee in the terms and conditions of the individual's employment on the basis of his
or her age, provided that the individual is 40 years of age or older.
In order for an employee to establish the possibility that he or she is a victim of age
discrimination, the employee must satisfy four preestablished conditions or proofs. First, he or
she was a member of the class of employees protected under the ADEA. Thus, the applicant
or employee must show that he or she is 40 years of age or older. Second, the applicant or
employee must be minimally qualified for the job in question, meet minimum job
requirements. Third, the employee must have suffered an adverse employment action (i.e.,
discharge, demotion, denial of a pay raise, not hired, etc). Fourth, it must be shown that
younger employees were treated more favorably (Meziere v. Dearborn Crane real Engineering
Ca., 1998). In regard to this fourth factor, it is important to understand that the term
favorably treated "younger employee" is not restricted to employees who are outside the
protected age group, those under the age of 40. A "younger employee" may also be an
individual who is over 40 but substantially younger than the complaining party (Kralman v.
Illinois Dept. of Veteran 's Affairs, 1994; O'onnor, v. Consolidated Coin Catering, 1996).
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 was enacted to prevent discnmination in
employment against a qualified individual on the basis of a real or perceived disability (Title
I), prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities in public transportation (Title
II), and provide for public accommodation and access for persons with a disability (Title III).
In regard to employment, the most important thing to remember is that the ADA only protects
qualified individuals with a disability from discrimination. It does not protect unqualified
individuals with a disability any more than the other EEO laws protect such individuals.
To fall under the provisions of the ADA, a small business must have 15 or more employees.
If covered, the Act states that no entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
12
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the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job traming,
and other terms, conditions, and pnvileges of employment (42 U.S.C. tj 12112(a)).
To determine whether an applicant or current employee is protected under the ADA, two basic
questions must be answered: (I) is the individual disabled? and, if so, (2) is the individual
qualified" .The ADA defines the term "disability" to mean: a physical or mental impairment
that substantially hmits one or more of the major life activities of an individual, a record of
such impairment, or regarding an individual as having such an impaimient. This means that
those who currently are disabled are protected under the ADA. Additionally, those who were
disabled but have since recovered or have been rehabilitated are covered. Surprisingly,
applicants or employees who are not now, nor have they ever been, afflicted with a mental
or'hysicaldisability covered under the ADA may still be protected if the employer thought that
they had a disability and discriminated against them because of the imagined disability. As
strange as thts may sound, an employer may violate the ADA by erroneously assuming a
nondisabled individual is disabled.
An employer runs the nsk of triggering an ADA claim any time an employment decision is
determmed based on an individual's perceived disability. In one case, an employer refused to
hire an applicant for the position of electrician because a drug test indicated that his blood
sugar was high, and it was assumed he was diabetic. The employer's action was based on the
assumption that the applicant had an impairment that would substantially restrict his ability to
perform the essential functions of the job. However, this was a false assumption, and the
applicant, who was not disabled as defined under the ADA, was able to perform all essential
functions of an electrician. Because the applicant was perceived to be disabled and the
decision not to hire him was based on that perceived disability, the employer violated the
ADA (Robinson, Franklin, &Wayland, 2002).
The meaning of "disability" under the ADA entails having a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. Major life activities include
such activities as: caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing,'peaking,
breathing, learning, and working (29 C.F.R. (j 1630.2(l) (1997)). As for physical
impairment, this can be any physiological condition, disfigurement, or loss of one of eleven
body systems.
In a recent Supreme Court decision, Suaon v. United Airlines, lac., (527 U.S. 471 (1999)) it
was concluded that individuals with impairments which are corrected by medical or other
measures to normal functional levels are not "disabled" under the ADA. For example,
individuals who have their eyesight corrected by glasses or persons with high blood pressure
that is controllable with medication would not be considered as disabled under the ADA. In
both instances, the physical impairment, because it was corrected, no longer substantially
affects the individual's major life function. Though the individuals are impaired, they are not
suAiciently impaired to be disabled as defined by the ADA.
Mental impairment encompasses any mental or psychological disorder that results in: mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional illness, mental illness, or specific learning
disabilities. These are very broad areas and encompass an extremely wide range of conditions.
Once the individual's "disability" has been established, the next question must be asked: is the
individual with the disability qualified? If the individual can perfoim the essential job
functions without any accommodation, he or she is qualified. If not, then what is the
appropriate reasonable accommodation that would permit performance of these functions?
Reasonable accommodation refers to modifications that would permit the individual with a .
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disability to perform the essential functions, provided that these modifications do not create an
undue hardship for the employer.
In determining reasonable accommodation, the employer may ask the md&vidual for
reasonable documentation about the disability and functional limitations. But, employers
should be careful. The ADA prohibits the employer from requestmg medical information
which is not pertinent to the accommodation (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 1999). This usually precludes employers from requesting complete medical
records on the indwidual in question because such records would include a good deal of
information not related to the accommodation. The EEOC recommends that when requesting
medical information, employers should specify what types of information they need regarding
the disability and the functional limitations it imposes (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 1999). Remember, once this information is obtained, the employer is
responsible for keeping it confidential. As for making accommodation under the ADA, the
EEOC has developed 3 categories of "reasonable accommodation." When attempting to
accommodate an apphcant or employee, an employer should consider: (I) modifying the job
application process (i e., providmg readers for applications or employment exams), (2)
modifying the work environment (i.e., flexible or part-time scheduling, job restructuring,
reconfiguring work areas, etc.) or (3) modifying the benefits and privileges of employment
(i.e., allowing employees to use vacation or personal leave to attend therapy sessions) (U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1999).
Employers, particularly small employers, are not required to provide any of these
accommodations if they cause an un&lac t&arttship. If they create an undue hardship for the
employer the applicant is not considered to be a qualified individual with a disalniiry. For
example, a paraplegic applies for the position of truck driver at a small delivery company.
But, technology is not currently available that would permit the applicant to perform the
essential functions of the job (Stone v Mount Vernon, 1996).
In determimng undue hardship, the ADA requires that four factors must be considered. First,
what is the overall cost of the accommodation compared to the overall financial resources of
the business, number of persons employed at the place of business, and its projected effect on
the operating expenses of the facility? Second, the overall financial resources, number of
employees, and number and location of all the facilities owned by the employer are
considered in regard to the cost of the accommodation. Third, the accommodation must be
considered in light of the type of operation in which the employer is engaged. This includes
considering the organizational structure, the functions of the workforce, the geographic
separateness of facilities, and the degree of administrative or fiscal interdependence between
the facility and other operations of the employer. Fourth, the impact that the accommodation
will have on the operation of the facility in question must be considered. All of these
considerations are extremely broad and make developing viable human resource policies
difficult. Finally, provided proper job analysis was performed on the job in question, the
employer is not required to change the essential job functions. Unfortunately for small
business owners, undue hardship is determined too often on a case-by-case basis.
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Some small employers may have crossed the employee number "line" where they must
comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993. Those small businesses
subject to the FMLA must be engaged in commerce, or industries or activities affecting
commerce, and employ 50 or more full-time employees working 20 or more weeks during the
current or preceding calendar year (29 U.S.C. 13 2611(4)(A)). Furthermore, in order for
employees to be eligible for the FMLA leave benefit, they must work at a facility where the
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employer has at least 50 employees within a 75-mile radius (29 U.S.C. Ij 2611(2)(b)(ii)).
Eligible employees can receive a total of 12 weeks of unpaid leave in a 12-month period for
the following reasons (29 U.S.C. Ij 2612(a)(1)): (I) the birth and care of the employee's
newborn child, (2) the adoption or foster care of the employee's son or daughter, (3) a serious.
health condition of the employee's spouse, child, or parent, or (4) the employee's own serious
health condition. In order to qualify for the above mentioned benefit, the employee requesting
the FMLA leave must have worked for a covered employer for at least 12 months and must
have worked for that employer for at least 1,250 hours during the previous 12 months (29
U.S.C. tj 2611(2)(A)).
During the FMLA leave period, the small business would be required to maintain the
employee's group health insurance coverage just as though the employee was still in a
working status. It is important to note that if the group health insurance is a contributory plan
(the employee shares the benefit cost with the employer), the employee is still responsible for
paying his or her share of the benefit costs during the leave period.
Upon returning from FMLA leave, the employer is obligated to ensure that the employee is
returned to the same or an equivalent job (29 U.S.C. tj 2614(a)(1)). Furthermore, the FMLA
provides the employee with a complaint process (through the DOL Wage and Hour Division)
in the event that the employer fails to do so.
There are two additional FMLA-related concerns with which small employers should be
acquainted. First, DOL regulations governing FMLA leave require employers to provide
individual written notices to individual employees (29 C.F.R. Ij 825.301). Second, should the
employer fail to provide such individual notices, that employer may not count any leave the
employee has taken as FMLA leave (29 C.F.R. Ij 825.700). In other words, if an employer
failed to notify an employee that the amount of leave that he or she was granted was being
counted as FMLA leaye, the employee could then turn around and request up to his or her full
12 week entitlement under the Act.
On March 19, 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Ragsdale v. Wolverine
IVorldwide, lnc. that the DOL's penalties for failing to notify the employee that sick leave
will be designated as part of the FMLA entitlement were disproportionate and inconsistent
with Congress'ntent. Unfortunately, the Ragsdale decision only limits the penalty, imposed
by the DOL to not exceed a total of 12 weeks leave combined with previously granted leaves
such as sick leave or personal time. To illustrate this distinction, assume that an employee
had previously exhausted 6 weeks of his or her company sick leave, because the employer
failed to notify her that the previous 6 weeks of leave was to be used against her 12-week
entitlement. As a result, the employer could only be required to provide up to a maximum of
an additional 6 weeks of unpaid FMLA leave. The Ragsdale decision only limits the DOL
from imposing a leave penalty that would exceed the 12 weeks mandated by law.
Consequently, small employers who are covered under the FMLA should develop policies for
notification of individual employees when leave is taken. It is important that such notification
be made even when the medical leave is part of a preexisting benefit program (i.e., sick leave,
maternity leave, vacation, personal leave, etc.). There should be no doubt in the employee's
mind that the leave will be considered part of the employee's FMLA entitlement.
WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) of 1988 applies to any
business that employs 100 or more employees, excluding part-time employees, or 100 or more
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employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week, exclusive of hours of
overtime (29 U.S.C. tj 2101(a)(1)). Covered employers are required to provide a 60-day
written notice to employees in the event of a plant closing or mass layoff. No employees may
be laid off until the end of this 60-day period following the written notice. In addition to this
employee notification requirement, the employer must notify the state dislocated worker unit
(designated under Title III of the Job Training partnership Act) (29 U.S.C. tj 1651 et sett.).
Additionally, a written 60-day notice must be given to the chief elected official of the unit of
local government to which the employer pays the highest taxes (29 U.S.C. () 2102(a)).
For the purpose of WARN, the term plant closing means the permanent or temporary
shutdown of a single site of employment or one or more facilities or operating units within a
single site of employment, provided that the shutdown results in an employment loss of 50 or
more employees (excluding part-time employees) at the single site during any 30-day period(29 U.S.C. tj 2101(9)(2)).
Assume that a company employs 200 workers at two plants. Due to financial demands, one
plant employing 70 workers will be closed permanently. Since the closing involved 50 or
more full-time employees, the written 60-day notification would have to be given. If, on the
other hand, the plant designated for closing only employed 35 employees, WARN's
notification provisions would not apply. Be cautious, as there may be state laws that would
impose a state requirement to provide notification. Employers are responsible for knowing
state laws that relate to plant closings as well.
A mass layoff occurs when a reduction in force is not the result of a plant closing but involves
at least one-third (33 percent) of the employees (excluding part-time employees), and at least
50 employees are laid off for at least a 30-day period. Under this provision, an employer with
120 full-time employees who had to lay off one-third of its employees would not be required
to provide the 60-day notification. Yes, the employer would be covered under WARN (more
than 100 workers were employed). Yes, at least one-third of the workforce was laid off.
However, this would require 40 employees being laid off which is 10 short of the 50
established in the Act to meet the definition of tnass layoff.
There is one more circumstance under which a mass layoff would be established. In any
instance in which at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees) are laid off,
regardless of the percentage of the workforce, a mass layoff is considered to have occurred,
and the employer is required to provide a 60-day notice. Therefore, a plant employing 2,000
workers would be required to provide notice if it laid off 500 employees within a 30-day
period, even though this would result in a 25 percent reduction in force (a proportion less than
the 33 percent specified for smaller employers).
An exception to the 60-day notification is permitted when the closing or layoff is the result of
the relocation or consolidation of part or all of the business. However, prior to the closing or
layolf, the employer must offer to transfer the affected employees to a different site of
employment within a reasonable commuting distance. Furthermore, such transfers cannot
result in more than a 6-month break in employment (29 U.S.C. 13 2101(b)(2)). Additionally,
the employer is not required to give notice when it offers to transfer employees to any other
site of employment regardless of distance provided that there is no more than a 6-month break
in employment and the employee accepts within 30 days of the offer or by the date of the
closing or layoff, whichever is later (29 U.S.C. tj 2101(b)(2).
To illustrate this point, assume that a plant was to be closed on April I, 2003, and an
employee was given the option to transfer to another plant on March 15, 2003. That employee
would have until April 14, 2003, to accept or reject the transfer offer. Regardless of the
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employee's decision, the employer would not have to give a 60-day notice of the plant
closure.
The 60-day notification period may also be reduced under circumstances that necessitate a
plant closing or mass layoff resulting from business circumstances that were not reasonably
foreseeable to afford the 60-day notification. For example, no notice would be required if the
plant closing or mass layoff resulted from a natural disaster such as a flood, earthquake, or
drought.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Small business is the backbone of the American economy. Most businesses begin with only a
few employees and either expand to meet consumer demand for their goods and/or services or
fail as a result of poor management or poor planning. Successful small businesses are
confronted with additional external legal and regulatory factors as revenues, capital
investment, and business operations expand and increase. Not surprising, federal and state
taxation and capital formation issues generally are the primary focus of owners and managers.
However, employment, safety, and environmental issues often are as important in the
successful transition from a small, closely held enterprise to a larger organization with more
duties and responsibilities to its employees, the public, and the government. Proper planning
m these three areas allows a small business to grow without incurring burdensome remedial
expenses to bring itself into compliance with statutes and regulations.
Although most federal employment laws apply only to small employers when they meet a
minimum threshold of employees, some apply regardless of size while the minimum threshold
vanes from law to law. Therefore, it is imperative that small employers are aware of the
provisions and requirements of key federal legislation. Specifically, this paper suggests that
small employers should have general knowledge of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act.
By understanding their comphance obligations, small employers will be able to make
employment decisions that will allow their businesses to prosper and grow and avoid costly
and time consuming remedial efforts to bring their businesses into compliance with applicable
laws and regulations.
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